We study one of the many aspects of privacy, which is referred to as data anonymity, in a formal context. Data anonymity expresses whether some piece of observed data, such as a vote, can be attributed to a user, in this case a voter. We validate the formal treatment of data anonymity by analyzing a well-known electronic voting protocol.
Introduction
The privacy of users of electronic services is certainly not a matter of course. Electronic services like loyalty schemes and payment systems (e-auctions and electronic tolling for instance) may have severe consequences in the field of privacy. Currently foreseen developments like RFID [4] lead to a growing concern in this respect.
In the framework of "privacy" several aspects can be discerned. In the Common Criteria [31] the functional class FPR distinguishes between four aspects of privacy: anonymity, pseudonymity, unlinkability and unobservability. Anonymity, the topic of our research, ensures that a someone may use a resource or service without disclosing its identity. Pseudonymity ensures that someone may use a resource or service without disclosing its identity, but can still be hold accountable for that use. Unlinkability ensures that a someone may make multiple uses of resources or services without others being able to link these uses together. Unlinkability differs from pseudonymity in the sense that, although in pseudonymity the user is also not known, relations between different actions can be provided. Unobservability ensures that someone may use a resource or service without others, especially third and define a formal framework to reason about this concept.
As already mentioned, data anonymity plays an essential role in voting systems. Electronic voting systems aim to provide a convenient, efficient and secure facility for recording and tallying votes. E-voting can be used in order to realize elections at a small local scale such as share holder meetings to full-scale national elections. Lipmaa [36] discerns two instances of e-voting: kiosk voting (voting in some fixed location using special hardware) or Internet voting using generally available devices, e.g. a PC or a mobile phone. In the literature several sets of requirements are found applicable to e-voting schemes [6, 25, 20] . These requirements are not identical. In [19] Cranor and Cytron made a survey of the literature and formulated four security related core properties.
accuracy (1) It should not be possible to alter votes. ( 2) It should be impossible to cause a situation where a valid vote is not taken into account. (3) On the other hand, an invalid vote should not be counted in the final tally.
invulnerability (1) Only eligible voters are allowed to vote. (2) These voters are only allowed to vote once.
verifiability Everyone should be able to verify independently that counting of the votes has been done correctly.
privacy (1) It is not possible for anyone to link a vote to a voter. (2) Moreover, a voter cannot prove that she voted in a specific manner.
In order to fulfill the above mentioned requirements the designers of e-voting systems have devised security protocols between different entities in the system. The goal of these protocols is to guarantee that the system fulfills the requirements even in the presence of an intruder. It is clear that our notion of data anonymity refers to the first part of the privacy requirement.
Broadly spoken, two groups of e-voting schemes can be discerned: (i) schemes that use homomorphic encryption (see, for example, [6, 17, 18, 29] ); (ii) schemes requiring an anonymous channel which is used to hide the identity of the voter when casting his vote (including [14, 25, 40, 11] ).
The voting scheme of Fujioka, Okamoto and Ohta [25] -which we concentrate on and which we refer to hereafter as the FOO voting scheme -makes use of blind signatures. In voting schemes using blind signatures, the voter obtains a token from the Administrator, which is a message blindly signed by the Administrator. After this registration phase, the voter can unblind the token and send his encrypted vote (signed by the administrator) to the Counter via an anonymous channel. Finally, the voter sends her decryption key -again via an anonymous channel -to the counter. After decryption, the counter adds the vote to the tally. The complete e-voting protocol will both informally and formally be described in Section 3 below.
As said before, the FOO scheme makes use of an anonymous channel. In their paper Fujioka, Okamoto and Ohta do not formulate explicit requirements concerning the anonymous channel however. Several anonymous channels have been proposed and analyzed. We mention [12, 44, 41, 32, 26, 50, 52] and [21, 43] .
Informal analysis of the FOO voting scheme [25, 45] indicates that it fulfills the data anonymity requirement. Herschberg, Cranor and Cytron perform informal analyses of the voting systems EVOX and Sensus [28, 19] , that are based on FOO. Herschberg [28] concludes that in the EVOX system the data anonymity aspect is only compromised if the anonymous channel is broken, that is if the channel reveals information about the origin of votes to the counter. Cranor and Cytron [19] argue that the system Sensus fulfills the first part of the privacy requirement and does not realize the second. In other words, Cranor argues that Sensus fulfills data anonymity whereas it does not prevent a voter to show that he voted in a certain way. In this paper we will formally analyze the FOO voting scheme. More specifically, we will verify to what extent FOO is in line with the given definition of data anonymity. In their paper [35] , Kremer and Ryan present a formal analysis of three security aspects of the FOO voting protocol. Fairness and eligibility are proven using the ProVerif tool [8, 9] , while for privacy they give a manual proof in the applied pi calculus [1, 2] . Their privacy proof consists of verifying that two systems are observationally equivalent. In the first system, voter V 1 has vote v 1 and voter V 2 has vote v 2 , while in the second system voter V 1 has vote v 2 and voter V 2 has vote v 2 . If these systems cannot be distinguished by an observer, the voters and their votes are unlinkable. This is reminiscent to the control anonymity of the permutation based approach of [46] .
In [39] Nielsen, Andersen and Nielson present an analysis of the FOO protocol using the LySa calculus. The LySa calculus is a dialect of the π-calculus centered around the concept of a global network [10] . In [39] the FOO protocol is formalized with LySa. It is argued that the protocol satisfies the requirements of accuracy and verifiability, as well as democracy and fairness. For anonymity, the unlinkability of voter and vote is considered, but not proven formally.
The main difference between the above approaches and ours is that we define the attribution set of a voter (complementary to the anonymity set), which contains all votes that can possibly be attributed to a voter. This allows us to measure the anonymity of a voter, whereas the approach of Kremer and Ryan provides a yes/no answer. In the case of the FOO protocol the attribution set is a useful notion, since Fujioka, Okamoto and Ohta are not completely clear about the status of the synchronization points they mention. Are these synchronizations required for the protocol to work? Are there any possible alternative synchronization points that will do? We will be able to analyze such questions after determining the attribution sets of the FOO protocol without synchronization points. Our approach also supports to design alternative approaches to increase the attribution set without providing full anonymity still. Such practical anonymity is attractive for larger scale application and may be achievable without the mentioned synchronization points.
Our formalization of the FOO voting scheme exploits an ACP style process algebra [5, 23, 7] . In the modeling of [35] , the anonymous channel is not made explicit. In the applied pi calculus, every channel is anonymous unless input and output can be explicitly linked. By explicitly modeling the anonymous channel here, we take the opposite stance. Therefore, we can formally show that the level of data anonymity of the FOO voting scheme depends on two items: (i) the behaviour of the anonymous channel; (ii) the way of synchronization after the registration phase. Our formal analysis reveals that from the viewpoint of data anonymity these items are interrelated. If no synchronization takes place after the registration phase, data anonymity can only be obtained if extra requirements are put on the anonymous channel. In the case voters may only start voting after everyone has registered, the anonymous channel may be less sophisticated. Finally, as explained in Section 5, our analysis suggests a weakness in case the publication medium is compromised. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide a formal definition of data anonymity. In Section 3 we describe and specify the FOO voting scheme. Section 4 provides a characterization of anonymity of voters in the FOO voting scheme in terms of attribution sets, whereas Section 5 presents the resulting vulnerability analysis. In Section 6 we discuss conclusions and future research.
Data Anonymity Framework
Let Data, Keys, Nonces and Users, ranged over by d, k, n and u, be the primitive classes of (sensitive) data, keys, nonces and users. The class Terms of terms, ranged over by ϕ, is given by the BNF
So, a term is either a primitive element, a pair of terms, the encryption of a term ϕ with the key k, or the term ϕ attributed to the user u. The attribution construction [ ϕ ] u is used to associate a term with a user. In particular, we will be interested in the sensitive data that can be linked to a specific user. We use d ⊆ u ϕ to denote that the datum d occurs in subterm [ ψ ] u of the term ϕ.
We will use the construct [ ϕ ] u in a process description to indicate with respect to which data we are interested in anonymity. Protocols are modeled such that none of the agents (including the intruder) can inspect or modify the attribution. It should be considered as a construct at the meta-level; its sole purpose is to facilitate verification.
The class Event of events, ranged over by e, consists of triples sender, receiver, ϕ representing the communication of the term ϕ from the user sender to the user receiver. Thus, Event = Users × Users × Terms. In case e = sender, receiver, ϕ , we use msg(e) to denote the term ϕ. In a given setting we fix a class Obs ⊆ Event of observables.
The class Traces of traces, given by Traces = Event * and ranged over by t, consists of all finite traces of events. The semantics of a system S is given by the set of traces traces(S) ⊆ Traces. We refer to traces(S) as the trace set of the system S. The function obs : Traces → Traces is defined by obs(ε) = ε obs(e · t) = e · obs(t) if e ∈ Obs obs(e · t) = obs(t) i fe / ∈ Obs.
Clearly, for any t ∈ Traces, it holds that obs(t) ∈ Obs * . We use the notation ϕ ∈ t for a term ϕ and trace t if, for some sender sender and receiver receiver the event sender, receiver, ϕ is an event of t. We use the notation d ∈ u t for a datum d and trace t if d ⊆ u ϕ for some term ϕ ∈ t. We write, for a trace t, ⊥ ∈ u t if for no datum d it holds that d ∈ u t. We use a as typical element of Data ⊥ = Data ∪ {⊥}. The class Know of knowledge sets, ranged over by K, is the collection of subsets of terms, i.e. Know = P(Terms). For a particular situation we fix a knowledge set I ∈ Know called the initial intruder knowledge. The auxiliary function know : Know × Traces → Know, to be given in a minute, returns for a knowledge set K and trace t the knowledge that is built up starting from the knowledge K along the trace t. First, we need a notion of closure for knowledge sets. We say that the term ϕ can be derived from the knowledge set K, notation K ϕ, if ϕ can be derived from K by repetitive use of the derivation rules in Table 1 . The closure closure(K) of a knowledge set K is then given by
Based on this notion of closure, the function know can be given by
where J = closure(K ∪ {msg(e)}).
Note that the accumulation of knowledge in the definition above, ignores sender and receiver roles. So, all communication of a trace can be observed. To compensate for this, we use the function obs to prevent that particular traffic is collected.
In order to deal with encrypted terms we introduce the notion of tagging, an auxiliary technical mechanism to mark terms that cannot be decrypted by the observer or intruder. In essence, with keys k, , m not in the particular knowledge set, it helps to distinguish, for terms ϕ, ψ and ρ, the two traces {ϕ} k · {ψ} from {ρ} m · {ρ} m while identifying the two traces {ϕ} k · {ψ} and {ψ} · {ϕ} k . First we introduce the class Tags of tags with typical element τ . The class TagTerms is constructed similar to the class Terms but with Tags added as a new primitive ingredient. Thus, TagTerms, also ranged over by ϕ, is given by the BNF
The class TagTraces is the collection of finite strings of tagged events, i.e. finite strings of triples sender, receiver, ϕ where ϕ ∈ TagTerms. A tagging is an injective mapping θ : Terms → Tags. Given a knowledge set K and a tagging θ, the interpretation function int So, if a term ϕ is encrypted with a key k that does not belong to the knowledge set under consideration, the composed term {ϕ} k is interpreted as a tag, viz. the tag θ({ϕ} k ) ∈ Tags yielded by the tagging θ. Now, two traces t, t ∈ Traces are considered equivalent with respect to a knowledge set K, notation t ∼ K t , if they yield the same knowledge and are equal upto renaming of tags, i.e. know(K, t) = know(K, t ) and there exists a bijection β :
For example, for traces
∈ K, and an arbitrary tagging θ, we have int
If β : Tags → Tags is a bijection of tags that switches τ 1 and τ 3 , we obtain int
On the other hand, no bijection γ : Tags → Tags will, assuming τ 1 = τ 3 , verify γ(τ 1 ) = τ 1 and γ(τ 3 ) = τ 1 . So, for t 1 above and
The idea behind tagging is that different bit strings in different runs of the system can represent the same encrypted information. The difference can be due to non-essential phenomena, in particular a different choice of nonces in the other run. The identification of bitstrings does not make sense within the same system run where different bit strings represent really different data.
Finally, we are in a position to give the definition of our notion of an attribution set. Definition 2.1 Let S be a system with set of traces traces(S), set of observables Obs and initial intruder knowledge I. The attribution set AS t (u) of a user u with respect to the trace t ∈ traces(S) is given by
Thus, given a system run t, a datum d can be attributed to user u if for some trace t , that is the same as the trace t from the intruder's perspective, i.e. t ∼ I t , d is in fact associated with u, i.e. d occurs in a subterm that is associated with u in some message in t .
For instance, if u is a voter and t is a run of a voting protocol, then u's vote is anonymous in this run if from the viewpoint of the intruder every collected vote could have been attributed to u. This is the case if AS t (u) contains all votes collected in t.
The special element ⊥ can be assigned to a user u if in a trace t , observational equivalent to the trace t, no datum d is associated with the user u.
In case traces(S) = { t 1 , t 2 , t 3 } where
For user v it holds that AS t 1 (v) = {d 2 } as only d 2 is associated with v. Also, for user w, we have AS t 1 (w) = {d 3 } is a singleton. In t 2 no data is associated with w, whereas the trace t 3 is not observably equivalent to the reference trace t 1 .
The FOO Voting Scheme
In this section we will present the voting scheme proposed by Fujioka, Okamoto and Ohta in 1992. First, we give an informal explanation, that is used as a basis for an formal description that follows.
Informal Description
In this section we will explain the electronic voting protocol proposed by Fujioka, Okamoto and Ohta [25] , also known as the FOO voting scheme. This scheme is claimed to satisfy a number of security requirements, one of which is privacy of the voter. We will use the informal representation of the protocol in the Message Sequence Chart in Figure 1 to explain the protocol. The symbols occurring in the explanation are summarized in Table 2 .
The protocol describes the communication between an administrator, a number of voters and a counter. The role of the administrator is to check if the voter is eligible to vote and to sign the (blinded) ballot of the voter. The role of the counter is to collect all (anonymous) ballots and to publish them.
We focus on the protocol interactions of an individual voter. Voter v starts by selecting his random secret key k(v) and a random nonce n(v) and he fills in his ballot b(v). By encrypting his ballot with his key, he constructs a committed ballot cb. At a later stage the voter will make his ballot public by (anonymously) providing cb and k(v). Next, the voter blinds his ballot with his secret nonce, which yields bcb. For this purpose, he uses the blinding operation denoted by * . In order to ensure that this is his blinded ballot, he signs the result, which gives sv.
The voter sends his identity, the blinded committed ballot and the signed blinded committed ballot to the administrator in order to allow the administrator to check that the voter is (still) eligible to vote and to verify v's signature. The administrator acknowledges the received ballot by signing it and returning the signed blinded committed vote sa to the voter. The signing algorithm used by the administrator is a so-called blinding signature technique [13] . The purpose is that the voter can obtain a signed committed ballot from the signed blinded committed ballot by applying the unblinding operator (denoted by /). Formally, this requires that the signing and blinding operations commute. Therefore, after verifying the signature of the administrator, the voter can deduce scb, which is his committed ballot signed by the administrator. After this, the role of the administrator ends and the voter communicates to the counter. Messages sent from the voter to the counter go via an anonymous channel, so that the identity of the sender of the messages cannot be retrieved.
The voter sends his committed ballot cb and its signed version scb to the counter, who verifies that it is indeed signed by the administrator. He stores the received information from all voters in the list L 1 and after all voters have voted (or after some deadline has passed), he publishes this list. Every voter can now verify that his committed ballot is in the list and sends the key to open the committed ballot to the counter (again using the anonymous channel). The counter opens the ballots and finally publishes the second list L 2 , containing all open ballots.
Note that we only explained the main line of the protocol. We did not specify exactly what happens if one of the checks fail due to an attempt to disrupt the voting by one of the participants. The interested reader is referred to [25] for the details. 
Formal Specification
Next, we provide a formal specification of the FOO voting scheme in process algebra (see, e.g., [5, 23, 7] ). This process algebra allows us to give a compact and formal specification of the set of all traces of the FOO voting scheme. However, it should be noted that, our treatment of anonymity is not tied to any particular specification formalism, as long as it supports reasoning about traces.
For the reader who is not familiar with the chosen specification language, we summarize the meaning of the constructs used. A process is specified by means of a (possibly recursive) equation. A process may be parametrized by a number of data values. Processes can be combined using operators. We use · to denote sequential composition, + to denote non-deterministic choice, Σ x∈X to denote the generalization of + over an index set X, to denote (interleaved) parallel execution, and x∈X to denote the generalization of over a index set X. The parallel composition operator also provides a means to synchronize two processes by synchronizing communicating events. The definition of the communication function takes the form a | b = c, which expresses that if events a and b occur in parallel, they will result in event c. In order to encapsulate partial communications (i.e. to force synchronization of events), the encapsulation operator ∂ H is used, where H is the set of communicating events that have to synchronize.
Apart from these operators at the process level, we will also need some operators and additional data types at the data level. Most of these have already been defined above. In addition we define types List1, List2, and Buffer to contain lists of pairs, lists of triples, and multisets of terms, respectively. We use the operator ⊕ to denote adding elements to a list as well as to a buffer. The deletion of an element is denoted by . We denote projection on the n-th element of a tuple by π n , and we extend this notation to lists of tuples in the obvious way. By V and Ballots we denote the set of all (potential) voters, and all ballots, respectively. The voters play the role of the users as introduced in Section 2.
Since the informal description of the protocol does not specify the precise characteristics of the anonymous channel (surprisingly, no standard definition is available in the literature) and the publication medium, we will have to take some design decisions in this respect. Thus, besides the three processes mentioned in the informal specification, we will define two more processes, representing the anonymous channel and the publication medium.
Therefore, we consider processes
and a family of processes Voter(v), for L 1 ∈ List1, L 2 ∈ List2, S ⊆ V, B ∈ Buffer, and v ∈ V. In addition, we use the subprocesses Counter , Publisher , and Publisher . Using shorthand notation c, a, ch, p for these processes, we denote the set of sources and destinations for messages by Dest = { c, a, ch, p } ∪ V.
Possible events are taken from the alphabet
Event s v→a (ϕ), for instance, means that voter v sends a message ϕ, apparently to the administrator. Likewise, r ch→c (ϕ) means that the counter receives a message ϕ, apparently coming from the channel.
In the formal description, we will use shorthand notation cb for {b} k , bcb for cb * n, sv for sig v (bcb), sa for sig a (bcb), and scb for sa/n(v).
We strive to obtain a minimal specification by leaving out all exceptional behaviour. Having understood the informal description of the protocol in the previous section, the formal algebraic specification is relatively easy to read. However, we will explain some of the intricacies of the design decisions that we made.
Voter(v) = b∈Ballots,k∈Keys,n∈Nonces
The voter starts by (non-deterministically) selecting his ballot, key, and nonce. Without making this explicit by the use of an internal event for this selection process, we assume that this choice is completely under control of the voter. Moreover, we require that different voters select different keys and different nonces. After having sent the first message, the voter receives his blinded committed ballot, signed by the administrator (sa). As an exception, this read event is not preceded by a summation. The reason is that, although the voter cannot construct this message himself, it is possible for him to verify whether the received datum satisfies the requirements. Given a deterministic signing algorithm, there will be only one such term. The ability to select only such validly signed term is expressed by the syntactic form of the expansion of sa, which is sig a (bcb), where bcb is known to the voter.
When the voter opens his ballot, by sending his key via the channel to the counter, we will have to model that the vote which is to be opened is attributed to this particular user. This attribution does not influence the behaviour of the system, nor is it observable by the intruder. The only reason to include this attribution is to enable the formal analysis of the system by determining the ballots that could be possibly attributed to this voter. Please notice that we did not require the voters to explicitly synchronize with the different phases of the election. The only event that can play this role is the reception of the lists from the publisher.
The administration process is parameterized by the set of voters that still have to vote. After having sent a signed ballot to a voter, the user is deleted from this set.
The counter proceeds in two stages, which are modeled by two different process variables. In the first stage the counter receives a term signed by the administrator. The transition from the first to the second stage is modeled in a non-deterministic way. This allows us to validate the system in case the counter makes this transition "too early". In the second stage the counter accepts keys which allow him to unpack the committed ballots. We remark that the condition ϕ ∈ π 1 (L 1 ) should be interpreted as not to take the user attribution in ϕ into account. The end of the second stage is also modeled non-deterministically.
The anonymous channel receives messages from a voter, which are added to the buffer. Alternatively, the channel can select any message from the buffer and pass it on to the counter.
The publisher process accepts a list from the counter and sends it to all voters. In the course of publishing the first list, the publisher can also receive the second list, after which this list gets distributed too.
Finally, we specify the complete system FOO as the parallel composition of all its agents. Hence,
We initialize the administrator with the set of all voters, and the other processes with empty lists and buffers. The communication function matches read and sent events, i.e.
s x→y (ϕ) | r x→y (ϕ) = c x→y (ϕ) for x, y ∈ Dest and ϕ ∈ Terms. The events c x→y (ϕ) are the concrete versions of the abstract events x, y, ϕ introduced in Section 2. The set H of encapsulated or forbidden events is given by
The set of traces traces(FOO) of the specified system now easily follows by applying the familiar operational semantics described in e.g. [5] . The definition of the anonymous channel requires that its input events cannot be observed by the intruder. Therefore, we define the set of observable events Obs = { c x→y (ϕ) | (x, y) = (v, ch), ϕ ∈ Terms }. We will not provide a precise definition of the initial intruder knowledge I. The reason is that we will consider the situation where all voters are trusted, as well as the situation in which some voters may be untrusted. Untrusted voters will be modeled by assuming that their chosen ballot, key and nonce are in the initial knowledge of the intruder.
The FOO Attribution Set
For the characterization of the attribution set of a voter we need an auxiliary definition. The predicate acmatch(i, t) holds true iff in trace t upto position i the number of blinded votes signed by the administrator exactly matches the number of covered votes received by the counter. The specific property of an index i such that acmatch(i, t), in a trace t of the FOO system, is that voters that have been registered no later than position i in t must have sent one of the covered votes collected by the counter upto this point.
Definition 4.1 The predicate acmatch is given by
The set of indices chunk(i, t) for an index i and trace t such that i ≤ len(t) is given by
It holds that, if j ∈ chunk(i, t) and t[j] is a registration sent by the administrator or a covered vote received by the counter, than t[j] is matched by a corresponding covered vote or registration t[h], respectively, with h ∈ chunk(i, t).
Given the above definition we are in a position to precisely describe the attribution set of a voter v with respect to a trace t of FOO. The characterization 
Theorem 4.2 For all v ∈ V and t ∈ traces(FOO) it holds that
Directly from Lemma 4.5 and Lemma 4.8 below. 2 So, Theorem 4.2 states that the attribution set AS t (v) of a voter v with respect to a trace t of the FOO system, contains a vote b iff
• the registration of v of her blinded committed vote bcb is confirmed by the administrator, i.e. v receives sa = sig a (bcb), at some position i in t,
• at some position j in t, the counter received a covered vote {b} k together with the administrator's signature scb for {b} k
• that could have matched the registration conformation at position i, i.e. the position j is later than i in t and is in the same chunk of t as i is,
• whereas the opening of the covered vote {b} k , i.e. the receipt of the counter of the pair ({b} k , k), at some position in t, yields the vote b.
The special element ⊥ is included in AS t (v) iff the registration of voter v was confirmed by the administrator at position i in t, but
• registrations and deposits of committed ballots where never in balance since then, i.e. for no position j later than i in t the predicate acmatch(j, t) holds, so that voter v may not have sent her vote to the counter at all or that her vote was lost underway, or,
• there is a committed ballot that could match v's registration, i.e. for some position j later than i and in the same chunk as i in t, which is never opened, i.e. the corresponding key k never reached the counter.
Note that an opening ({b} k , k) as described above, may originate from a voter v different from v. Thus, with the meta-level annotation to attribute data to users in processes (not interpreted at the process level) the action c ch→c (
The two inclusions underlying a proof of the theorem have been split over two lemmas. First we collect a few properties of the traces of FOO that follow straightforward from the definitions.
The next lemma states that acmatch and hence chunk respect the equivalence ∼ I . The lemma follows from the observation that the matching is based on the senderreceiver information and the form, not the content, of events.
Lemma 4.4 Suppose t ∼ I t and k ∈ know(I, t). If t[i]
Next we prove half of the characterization theorem.
Lemma 4.5 Let RHS t (v) be short for the concrete characterization of AS t (v) as given by Theorem 4.2. Then it holds that AS t (v) ⊆ RHS t (v), for every voter v and trace t of FOO.
Proof. Let t ∈ FOO and v ∈ V. Assume b ∈ AS t (v). Pick t ∈ traces(FOO) such that t ∼ I t and b ∈ v t . From Lemma 4.3 we obtain that
for some indices i , j and and suitable key k and nonce n. Note k ∈ know(I, t ), so the term {[ b ] v } k can be interpreted. Since t ∼ I t if follows that, for suitable indices i, j and ,
From the definition of the administrator and voter processes of FOO it follows that ϕ = sig a ({b } k * n ) for some ballot b , key k and nonce n , as this is the only type of communication from the administrator to voter v. Since both ψ and ρ can be completely interpreted by the intruder modulo the user attribution, we get that ψ = ({b} k , sig a ({b} k )) and ρ = ({[ b ] v } k , k) for some voter v . It remains to show that j ∈ chunk(i, t). As i and j match in t , this follows from Lemma 4.4 since t ∼ I t . Assume ⊥ ∈ AS t (v). Pick again t ∈ FOO such that t ∼ I t and ⊥ ∈ v t . We distinguish two cases: (i) voter v did only register; (ii) voter v sent in her covered vote, but did not open it. In the first case, we have, for some index i and suitable b, k and n, t [i] = c a→v (sig a ({b} k * n)) but for no index j, j > i, it holds that t [j] = c ch→c ({b} k , sig a ({b} k )). So, t [j] remains unmatched. In the second case, we can pick indices i and j such that sig a ({b} k ) ). As t [i] and t [j] match, it follows that j ∈ chunk(i, t ). By the assumption on unique keys and ⊥ ∈ v t we derive that for no index it holds
Exploitation of the equivalence t ∼ I t , similar to the reasoning above, yields corresponding indices of t. It follows that ⊥ ∈ RHS t (v) too.
2
For the proof of the other half of Theorem 4.2 we need a combinatorial result. Suppose a's and b's come in pairs with the a of a pair preceding the corresponding b (such as registrations and covered votes in traces of FOO). In general, one can not change the arrangements of pairs without disturbing the precedence. E.g., in the trace a 1 a 2 b 1 b 2 we can swap b 1 and b 2 while maintaining a 1 ≺ b 1 and a 2 ≺ b 2 , but in a 1 b 1 a 2 b 2 we cannot. Roughly speaking, as long as some a is in the same chunk as any b with a ≺ b, we can find a pairing containing a pair of the occurrences of the particular a and b that respects the precedence.
Lemma 4.6 Let
(ii) w has no proper prefix with an equal number of a's and b's then, for any two p, q, 1 ≤ p < q ≤ s, there exists a permutation π of {1, . . . , s} such that π(q) = p for which the string w obtained from w by replacing each b r by b π(r) satisfies properties (i) and (ii).
Proof. Induction on s. Base case, s = 1: trivial. Induction step, s + 1: Pick indices p and q, 1 ≤ p < q ≤ s + 1. If a q occurs before b p swapping of b p and b q clearly satisfies the claim. So, suppose b p occurs before a q in w. By condition (ii), for some r it holds that b p occurs between a r and b r . The string w of length 2s obtained from w by first applying the swapping of b p and b r and then removing the pair a r , b r satisfies the two conditions. By induction hypothesis, there exists a permutation π on {1, . . . , s + 1}\r and a corresponding string w satisfying (i) and (ii). The permutation π that extends π with π (r) = r and the string w obtained from w by inserting the pair a r , b r back again verifies the claim. 2 Example 4.7 Put a 1 = w, a 2 = x, a 3 = y, a 4 = z and
The string wxXyzZY W satisfies the requirements (i) and (ii) of Lemma 4.6 above. For indices 1 and 2, we can simply swap W and X obtaining wzW yzZY X for a permutation that maps 1 to 2. For the indices 2 and 4, we cannot, on wxXyzZY W , do a similar swapping of X and Z, as z would then no longer preceed Z. Therefore, we use W as auxilliary permuting element by mapping 2 to 4 (as intended) and 4 to 1, 1 to 2 yielding wxW yzXY Z.
We next prove the remaining part of the characterization of FOO's attribution set.
Lemma 4.8 It holds that RHS t (v) ⊆ AS t (v), for every voter v and trace t of FOO.
Proof. Suppose t ∈ FOO and v ∈ V. Pick b ∈ RHS t (v). We consider the typical case that v timely submits its covered vote and opening, leaving the other two degenerate cases to the reader. Choose suitable indices, data elements and voter v such that
. Moreover, i < j and j ∈ chunk(i, t). By the matching lemma 4.6 we can arrange for a trace t of FOO such that t ∼ I t and voter v submits a covered vote containing b. It follows that b ∈ AS t (v). Suppose ⊥ ∈ RHS t (v). Suppose data that t[i] = c a→v (sig a ({b} k * n)) and for no j, j > i, it holds that acmatch(j, t), for suitable indices. Then there exists h ∈ chunk(i, t) such that
By rearranging the activity of v and v we find a trace t ∈ FOO such that t ∼ I t and, for no ,
Vulnerability Analysis
In this section we interpret the results above and discuss (potential) vulnerabilities of the FOO voting scheme. Rather than providing a yes/no answer to the question whether the FOO voting scheme satisfies the privacy requirement claimed by Fujioka, Okamoto and Ohta, we have calculated the set of all ballots that could be attributed to a given user. There are several ways in which we can use this information to assess the vulnerability of the FOO voting scheme to privacy attacks.
Synchronization
The precise description provided by Theorem 4.2 is a starting point to look for ways to influence the privacy of the voter beneficially. In order to avoid the situation that votes are being submitted to the counter while voters are still able to register, Fujioka, Okamoto and Ohta suggest, as modeled in [35] , to synchronize the registration, sending and opening of ballots of voters. However, the authors of [25] make not explicit which synchronizations are essential. The same applies to the privacy analysis that is part of [35] .
One can distinguish three phases in the voting process: all registration takes place before any sending of ballots; openings are sent only after all votes have been sent in. This can be arranged by having explicit time lines. Looking at our specification, we find two places where synchronization may be implemented. The first way to synchronize affects the behaviour of the voters: they will have to wait until a certain deadline has passed before they submit their vote to the anonymous channel. After this deadline they will not try to register anymore. Disadvantage, when elections take place at a large scale, is that voter processes span a relatively large time frame. This may be undesirable from a usability point of view if such is at the responsibility of each individual voter. Therefore, as our formal specification facilitates, it is better to have the synchronization at another place, viz. to have the anonymous channel in charge for this. The anonymous channel specified above already starts producing output while still accepting input. One can adapt the process such that it first collects all inputs and only then starts to transmit:
(Further details to deal with time or voter counting have been suppressed here.) This implements a synchronization point and solves the problem. Note that, the solution boils down to the plain old ballot box which may only be opened for counting after collection of the votes.
Active intruder
Taking the intruder's perspective the goal is to minimize the attribution set for a (or any) voter. In case of a malicious administrator in a non-synchronized system, he can distinguish the ballot of the first voter by delaying all other voters until the first voter's ballot is transmitted by the anonymous channel. If time allows to repeat this process, the intruder can jeopardize the privacy of all voters.
In a synchronized system, though, at the publisher side a similar attack is possible for an active intruder, i.e. a malicious party that also adapts the information sent out to voters: Instead of presenting the voters with the correct list L 1 of committed ballots, the intruder blocks this communication (or takes over control over the publisher process) and sends a specific voter v 1 with a list with only one entry from the original list and all other entries garbled. All voters different from v 1 receive a completely garbled list. Now two cases should be distinguished: the remaining entry indeed was the covered vote of v 1 or it was not. In the former case, v 1 will be the only voter sending in his opening, since the other voters will miss their covered votes from the list. In the latter case, all voter processes block as their covered votes are missing. Thus, for a population of n voters, chances are 1 out of n that the privacy of a single voter, v 1 in our case, is compromised. In the possibilistic stance this amounts to stating that an active intruder has for any voter a trace that violates the voter's anonymity.
Although havoc may result from complaints of voters missing their covered votes from the published list, one may even try to stretch the approach a bit further. Instead of only presenting voter v 1 with a list with only one valid entry, now voter v 1 gets a list that is scrambled except for entry e 1 , voter v 2 gets a list that is scrambled except for entry e 2 , and so on. The qualitative interpretation then yields that the intruder has a trace in which all votes are revealed. However, as a variation of the well-known drunker sailor problem [38] , it follows, by linearity of expectation, that the expectation of the number of voters of which the privacy is breached is 1 only, thus showing no improvement (from the intruder's perspective) on the earlier attack. Due to their modeling of the privacy requirement, the analysis of the FOO protocol by Kremer and Ryan [35] did not reveal this weakness. In future work we aim at providing a precise analysis in which a Dolev-Yao intruder is modeled at the same level as the present representation of the processes involved.
Dummy votes
An alternative manner to enlarge the voter's attribution set is by exploiting the anonymous channel. Before any activity of voters, the anonymous channel accumulates a sufficient amount of signed dummy ballots from the administrator in the same way an eligible voter would do. Note that, the administrator is aware of the number of dummy votes that is generated this way. Next, when a regular voter presents a blinded committed vote to the anonymous channel, the channel not only outputs any of the regular votes it chooses, but also arbitrary many of its own registered dummy votes. The team of administrator and counter will not be able to tell the dummy votes and regular votes apart. As soon as the counter publishes the blinded committed vote on the first list of received votes, the voter can submit its opening without endangering its privacy.
The reason of the increased privacy lies in the size of the chunks, or rather, chunk. The predicate acmatch will only hold after the last bit of dummy votes have come out of the channel. if plenty of these are at disposal of the channel, this can be prolongated well after the last voter has sent in both its blinded vote and the opening thereof. Therefore the attribution set of all voters will be the set of all opened votes, together with ⊥, if applicable.
As is to be expected, the increased anonymity without a two or three phase voting regime comes at a price. The anonymous channel needs to be trusted, not only for prudence when dealing with private information as before, but also regarding the very outcome of the election. Obviously, the channel can cover the number of votes for any option on its part and open this after the votes have been collected. The net outcome will then be the grand total per option minus the number of dummy votes for this option. However, there is a priori no guarantee that the channel will deliver the votes it commits itself to, as long as there is no control mechanism in place for this. It is conjectured that zero-knowledge techniques can help here, a topic for further investigation. It is noted though, that the formal description of the attribution set as given by Theorem 4.2 has catalyzed the above line of reasoning, that is, to our best knowledge, not conceived before.
Unlinkability
One of the drawbacks of a formal verification is the fact that it considers a formal object, rather than an actual implementation. While implementing the protocol many decisions have to be made, e.g. with respect to the actual cryptographic primitives. A concrete cryptographic algorithm may have certain properties, which in a particular setting could be used by an intruder to his advantage. In the FOO voting scheme anonymity of the voter essentially depends on the unlinkability between two events: the sending of a blinded committed ballot to the administrator and the sending of the committed ballot (and its corresponding key) to the counter. Now, if the implementation allows an observer to link these events, anonymity is breached. Such vulnerabilities could e.g. be introduced by naive use of a probabilistic signing algorithm or by including network information of the voter in the payload of messages and thus to travel unmodified through the supposedly anonymous channel.
In case a Public Key Infrastructure is adopted when implementing the FOO voting scheme, then also possibilities might emerge for linking the blinded committed ballot bcb to the committed ballot cb. More specifically, one could think of an implementation of the FOO voting scheme where the administrator sends the signed blinded committed vote to the voter together with its public key and corresponding certificate. The certificate was created by the Certification Authority (CA). The voter can check the validity and integrity of the received public key by checking the corresponding certificate.
If the CA is not strictly separated from the administrator, then an attack is possible in the following way: The administrator generates a public/secret key pair for each voter and asks the CA to generate a certificate for each public key. The administrator signs the blinded committed ballot of each voter with a different secret key. He sends the signed blinded committed vote together with the corresponding public key and its certificate to the voter.
The voter checks the certificate of the received public key and verifies the signature of the blinded committed vote. Subsequently, he unblinds the signature and sends the unblinded signature to the counter. The counter (together with the administrator) can determine the identity of the voter by finding out what public key matches the received signature.
Another problem might arise if the administrator adopts a group signature scheme. Group signatures, see e.g. [15] , denote a signature scheme where each member of a group can generate a signature. The receiver (i.e. the voter in our case) cannot find out what group member generated it. When the administrator uses a group signature scheme he can act as a specific group member. Thus he has got the possibility to generate a signature specific for a certain voter. This leads to a link between the blinded committed ballot and the committed ballot.
Conspiring voters
In principle, a flooding attack might be possible in the presence of malicious and conspiring voters, affecting the availability of the system. However, if the system is synchronized in any of the two ways indicated above, conspiring agents can hardly influence the privacy of other agents. In order to model conspiring voters, we extend the initial intruder knowledge with the ballots, keys and nonces of the malicious voters. Repeating the calculation of the attribution set with this extended intruder knowledge will give a reduction of the attribution set as the ballots from the conspiring voters can be identified and deleted. We will not provide these calculations, since they are a straightforward extension of the case without conspiring voters. Care has to be taken to define the acmatch predicate in order to skip communications of the conspiring voters.
Conclusions
The main contribution of this paper is the definition of an attribution set. This set consists of all objects that can possibly be attributed to some user, given the observations of an intruder. It can be considered a measure for the data anonymity of the user. If, for some system, this attribution set can be calculated in an explicit form, it will give insight in the vulnerabilities of the system and it can be used to strengthen the protocol.
The analysis of the FOO voting scheme clearly supports our view. Not only did it show how an intruder could try to break anonymity, it also showed that a synchronization point would solve the problem. We indicated two possibilities for such a synchronization, one of which was not considered by the designers of the FOO voting scheme. Our analysis also revealed some other possible weakness. If the communication from the publisher process to the voters is compromised, the intruder can manipulate this in such a way that at least one vote can be attributed to its voter. Furthermore, a weakness occurs if the administrator can manipulate the distribution of his public signing key.
Common experience with the use of formal methods shows that the act of formalizing clarifies the assumptions underlying the correctness of a system. The original description by Fujioka, Okamoto and Ohta suffers from underspecification (the properties required from the anonymous channel are not made clear) as well as from overspecification (cryptographic algorithms are chosen, rather than their relevant properties). Our specification and analysis clarified some of these issues.
Our work can be extended in several directions. First of all, our specification only considered the main operation of the protocol: whenever an unexpected situation occurs, the involved agent will simply deadlock. In the original description such exceptions are treated in a more meaningful way. However, we think that such exception handling is not essential for reaching privacy, but to satisfy other properties. A second extension, as mentioned above, is to consider a Dolev-Yao intruder modeled as a first-class citizen, instead of an eavesdropping intruder as in the present setting. Our current analysis hints at system flaws in this setting, but further work on modeling synchronization is needed to make this precise. A last promising point for follow-up research is to look for zero-knowledge mechanisms for a secure injection of dummy votes, so that the attribution set of all voters can be maximized without putting unnecessary trust in the anonymous channel.
